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APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by Respondent against 
Appellants to enforce the provisions of an inter vivos trust 
executed by Respondent's grandmother and Appellants' mother. 
Respondent seeks a $7,000.00 distribution in addition to one-fourth 
of the residuary estate. Appellants, as co-trustees and benefi-
ciaries of the residuary estate, seek to reform the trust 
instrument by excluding Respondent from sharing equally in the 
residuary estate because of a scrivener's error by the attorney 
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preparing the trust instrument. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
A non-jury trial was had in this matter and the trial 
Judge granted judgment in favor of Respondent holding that an 
inter vivos trust cannot be reformed after the death of the 
trustor upon the claim of a scrivener's error. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the Judgment in the trial 
Court and for an order directing that said trust instrument be 
reformed allowing Respondent his $7,000.00 distribution but 
excluding Respondent from sharing equally with Appellants in the 
residuary estate of the trust. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1968, the trustor, Delia Zillah C. Rentmeister, 
retained attorney, William J. Critchlow, III, to perform estate 
planning services (R. 81). An inter vivos trust was prepared, 
executed by trustor and trustees, and introduced into evidence as 
Exhibit "A" (R. 45). The trust became immediately operative and 
was funded by the transfer of real and personal property (R. 54 
& 86) . 
During her first visit to Mr. Critchlow, trustor was 
undecided as to what part of her estate she should leave to her 
grandson who is the Respondent herein (R. 83). Trustor later 
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telephoned Mr. Critchlow advising him she wished to lea 
Respondent the sum of $5,000.00 and she confirmed tv 
call with a handwritten note entered into evidence 
(R. 83, 84, Sc 55b). Exhibit ,fC,f provides in part 
"I would like to leave my grandson I 
Rentmeister $5,000.00 and hope that . 
fair. Delia Rentmeister phone 825-2472." 
Pursuant to trustor's directions, the trust instrument 
provided in Article III, paragraph E, that Respondent was to 
receive $5,000.00 from the trust estate (R. 49 & 50). 
Through inadvertence and mistake on the part of the 
attorney, Article III, paragraph F, was dictated without excluding 
Respondent from sharing in the residuary estate with the three 
natural children of trustor, Appellants herein, (R. 50 & 88). The 
error was not discovered when the trust was executed nor later 
when it was amended (R. 88 & 89). 
In 1971, trustor telephoned Mr. Critchlow and directed 
him to increase Respondent's share from $5,000.00 to $7,000.00 
(R. 88). Pursuant to this direction, an amendment to the trust 
was prepared increasing Respondent's share to $7,000.00 (R. 88). 
Said amendment was introduced into evidence as Exhibit "B" (R. 55). 
Thereafter, trustor passed away on November 2, 1973 
(R. 88). Following trustor's death, Mr. Critchlow received a 
telephone call from an attorney representing Respondent demanding 
payment of $7,000.00 together with an undivided one-fourth interest 
in the residuary estate of the trust (R. 89). It was at this time 
that the scrivener's error was discovered and discussed (R. 89). 
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Should the trust not be reformed, Respondent, as a 
grandson of trustor, would receive $7,000.00 more than the natural 
children of trustor (R. 90). A one-fourth share of the residuary 
estate amounts to approximately $20,000.00 (R. 90). 
After said demand from Respondent's attorney, Appellants, 
as co-trustees and beneficiaries of the trust estate, refused to 
distribute to Respondent an undivided one-fourth interest in the 
residuary estate and Respondent filed suit (R. 1 & 12). In 
response thereto, Appellants filed an Answer and Counterclaim 
praying for reformation of Article III, paragraph F, of the trust 
instrument (R. 2). 
On October 3, 1975, the matter was tried before the 
Honorable Calvin Gould as a non-jury trial (R. 38). Exhibits "A" 
and "B", representing the trust instrument and amendment, were 
entered into evidence by stipulation and Respondent rested his 
case (R. 7 8). Thereafter, Appellants called Attorney William J. 
Critchlow, III, who testified concerning trustor's directions and 
the scrivener's error. 
Thereafter, judgment was entered in favor of Respondent 
and against Appellants with the trial Court holding that an inter 
vivos trust cannot be reformed after the death of the trustor 
upon the claim of a scrivener's error. The Court further held 
that in the absence of fraud or undue influence any variation 
between the instructions of the trustor and the completed 
document were immaterial (R. 59 & 6 0). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
AN INTER VIVOS TRUST CAN AND SHOULD BE REFORMED 
TO CONFORM TO THE TRUSTOR'S INSTRUCTIONS WHEN A 
MISTAKE IS MADE BY THE SCRIVENER IN THE PREPARA-
TION OF THE TRUST INSTRUMENT. 
Justice and common sense require correction of a 
scrivener's mistake in the preparation of a written document when 
such mistake thwarts the purposes and intent of the party executing 
the document. Reformation of the mistake based upon clear and 
convincing evidence is the appropriate remedy. 
In Paulsen v. Coombs, 253 P.2d 621, the Utah Supreme 
Court rendered judgment reforming a written contract which contained 
a provision inserted by inadvertence or mistake. The Court indicated 
as follows: 
"I am entirely in accord with the principle 
of preserving the sanctity of written contracts, 
but this applies only when the contract re-
presents the intent of the parties. Where 
errors occur, clerical, typographical or other-
wise , of course, a contract can be reformed to 
show the true intent of the parties. In order 
to prove such mistake and avoid the effects of 
the written contract, the evidence must be clear 
and convincing; that is, it must be such that 
there is no serious nor substantial doubt what 
the true intent is." 
In Webb v. Webb, 209 P.2d 201, where decedent's legal 
representative and another were claiming right to realty under 
decedent, and decedent's intention was important in determining what 
claimants' rights were, and where conversations between the attorney 
and the decedent were admitted into evidence, the Utah Supreme Court 
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observed as follows: 
111
 Thus where, after the death of the client, 
litigation arises between parties all of whom 
claim under the client and the question to 
be determined is not the existence of a right 
of action against the estate, but the inten-
tion of the decedent as to creation of various 
rights which remain ambiguous, the attorney 
may testify.***Thus an attorney has been per-
mitted to testify in an inquiry to ascertain, 
as between devisees under the client's will 
and a grantee claiming under a deed from the 
client made after the will, as to what was 
intended by the deed.111 
In Sine v. Harper, 222 P.2d 571, the Supreme Court of 
Utah was asked to reform a deed based on conversations between one of 
the parties and the real estate agent. In holding that this evidence 
was properly admitted, the Court quoted language from another opinion 
as follows: 
"'The conversations between the attorney and 
the decedent show the attorney's authority and 
the purposes and limitations of such authority. 
The conversations between the attorney and 
respondents showed negotiations for and the 
consummation of a deal with respondents in 
accordance with the attorney's authority. 
There was no assertion by an extra-judicial 
witness of a material fact for the purpose 
of proving the existence of such fact, but 
the fact that such conversations occurred 
were circumstances which showed the purpose 
and intention of decedent to convey to the 
respondents unconditionally. The attorney 
was the one who acted for the decedent in the 
transactions involved herein and his evidence 
was competent to relate his version thereof 
and a relation of the conversations he had 
with the principals in the transaction was 
not hearsay, even though it necessarily in-
cluded statements made by the other parties to 
the conversation which were not made in the 
presence of appellant. 
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'The rule is thoroughly well settled,1 remarks 
the California court, 'that, when the intention, 
feelings, or other mental state of a certain 
person at a particular time, including his 
bodily feelings, is material to the issues under 
trial, evidence of such person's declarations at 
the time indicative of his then mental state, 
even though hearsay, is competent as within an 
exception to the hearsay rule.'" 
In Hurst v. Kravis, 333 P.2d 314, the Supreme Court of 
Oklahoma was asked to reform six trust agreements. The settlors 
alleged that there had been a clerical error in the preparation of 
the trust instruments. In holding that the trust instruments 
should be reformed on the ground of clerical error in their pre-
paration, the Oklahoma Court observed as follows: 
"This court has held that a trust may be 
reformed because of mistake and clerical 
error." 
The case of Hurst v. Taubman, 275 P.2d 877, involved 
the construction of an express trust and was an action by settlors 
against the trustee. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held as follows: 
111
 In construing the terms of a trust agree-
ment the intention of the settlor of the 
trust should control when such intention is 
not in conflict with established principles 
of law.'" 
In Bench v. Pace, 538 P.2d 180, the Supreme Court of 
Utah held that the oversight on the part of a scrivener in preparing 
a real estate purchase option agreement was a proper basis for 
reformation of the document. 
In Ford v. Ford, 492 S.W.2d 376, trustees brought suit 
against the beneficiary seeking reformation or modification of an 
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irrevocable trust. The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas held that 
where the attorney who wrote the trust instrument intended to write 
the trust in such a fashion as to make it irrevocable for a period 
of ten years but made a mistake in drafting the trust, reformation 
of the trust instrument to reflect that the trust was irrevocable 
was proper. 
The case of First National Bank & Trust Company of 
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma v. Foster, 346 F.2d 49, involved an action 
to require co-trustees to accept an amendment or supplement to a 
trust agreement that they were administering. The United States 
Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, held that the intention of the 
settlor should control if not in conflict with established principles 
of law. 
In the case of Title Insurance and Trust Company v. 
Guasti, 256 P.2d 629, the District Court of Appeal of California 
held that where testamentary trusts contained no provision as to 
whether trusts were to be re-evaluated for the purpose of determining 
the trustee's fee, that the admission into evidence of custom of 
trust companies in the community was proper by way of parol proof. 
The Court further indicated that this evidence was necessary to give 
effect to the intention of the parties. 
In the case of In re Harmon's Trust, 164 N.Y.S.2d 468, 
the Supreme Court of New York County held as follows: 
"If, in fact, there was a scrivener's error 
in transcribing settlor's intention at the 
time of creating the trust, it is correctible 
by the court in an action to reform the 
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instrument.•.In all the cases where reformation 
was granted by the court, petitioner presented 
direct and convincing evidence of the necessary 
facts of settlor's original intentions and 
instructions and of the mistake in the instru-
ment as drawn," 
In the case of Leitner v. Goldwater, 48 N.Y.S.2d 614, 
the Supreme Court of Bronx County held that the evidence established 
that the settlors intentionally amended the trust agreement so as to 
designate their wives as partial beneficiaries, and that the 
subsequent modification purporting to reinstate the estates as 
beneficiaries arose out of error in transcribing the true agreement 
of the parties and that this error was a proper basis for reforma-
tion of the trust agreement. The Court further observed that the 
failure of the settlors to read the modification which they signed, 
because they were busy men who imposed great confidence in their 
lawyer, would not of itself vitiate the right to reformation. 
In the case of Vogel v. City Bank Farmers' Trust Company, 
272 N.Y.S. 643, the Supreme Court of New York County held that a 
trust deed could be reformed based upon an error and mistake of 
the attorney who prepared the document in failing to include a 
revocation clause. 
In Sheedy v. Stein, 101 N.Y.S.2d 773, the Supreme Court 
of Queens County held that it was proper to reform a deed because 
of a scrivener's error by the attorney who drew the deed. The 
Court observed as follows: 
"Where a mistake is made by the scrivener in 
reducing an agreement to writing, such mistake 
may be corrected 'no matter how it occurred.'" 
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In Delap v. Leonard, 178 N.Y.S. 102, the Supreme Court, 
Appellate Division, of New York, held that it was proper to reform 
a deed containing an error made by the lawyer scrivener and 
observed as follows: 
"The plaintiff should not be penalized 
because of this mistake. When there is no 
mistake about plaintiff's intention, but only 
in the writing, the mistake of the scrivener, 
no matter how it occurred, ought to be 
corrected. 
"And this is so, notwithstanding a long period 
of time has elapsed between the time of the 
execution of the deed and the discovery of the 
mistake." 
In the case of Mills v. Schulba, 213 P.2d 408, the 
District Court of Appeal of California held that it was proper 
to reform a deed because of a mistake of the attorney employed by 
the parties to draw up the deed. The Court observed: 
"Our courts have repeatedly held that the 
mistake of a draftsman is a good ground for 
the reformation of an instrument which does 
not truly express the intention of the parties." 
In Woolner v. Layne, 159 N.W.2d 237, the Court of Appeals 
of Michigan held that the inclusion of tax and insurance clauses 
in a lease was due to a scrivener's error which would serve as a 
basis for reformation of the document. The Court observed: 
"The mistake was made when the real estate 
broker's secretary chose a printed form 
which contained clauses which had not been 
bargained for or discussed. Indeed, this was 
a scrivener's error and 'the clearest case for 
reformation is one involving a scrivener's 
error.'" 
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In Sunnybrook Children's Homef Inc., v. Dahlem, 265 
SO.2d 921, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that a scrivener's 
error in a deed was a proper basis for its reformation. 
In Artmar, Inc., v. United Fire and Casualty Company, 
14 8 N.W. 2d 641, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the 
negligence of an insurance agent in failing to incorporate 
insurance desires of insured into the insurance contract was a 
proper basis for reformation of the insurance contract. The Court 
observed: 
11
 'A mistake due to the negligence of an 
agent, acting within the the scope of his 
employment, is satisfactory ground for 
reformation, since the insured ordinarily 
relies upon the agent to set out properly 
the facts in the application.1" 
At the trial of the subject matter, Respondent argued 
that the rules pertaining to wills should be applied to the subject 
inter vivos trust. The trustor, Mrs. Rentmeister, executed a Last 
Will and Testament which was not material to the case and was not 
introduced into evidence. It was the trustor's inter vivos trust 
that was at issue and not her will. We submit that an inter vivos 
trust that is effective immediately upon execution and one that is 
created during the lifetime of the trustor is not a will and 
should not be treated as such. In 1 Restatement of Trusts 2d §57, 
the following is found: 
"Disposition Inter Vivos Where Settlor 
Reserves Power to Revoke, Modify or Control 
"Where an interest in the trust property is 
created in a beneficiary other than the 
settlor, the disposition is not testamentary 
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and invalid for failure to comply with the 
requirements of the Statute of Wills merely 
because the settlor reserves a beneficial 
life interest or because he reserves in 
addition a power to revoke the trust in whole 
or in part, and a power to modify the trust, 
and a power to control the trustee as to the 
administration of the trust, 
"Comment: 
"a. Where settlor reserves power to revoke 
and modify. Where the owner of property trans-
fers it inter vivos to another person in trust, 
the disposition is not testamentary merely 
because the interest of the beneficiary does not 
take effect in enjoyment or possession before 
the death of the settlor (see §56, Comment f), 
or because in addition he reserves power to revoke 
or modify the trust. In such a case the trust 
is created in the lifetime of the settlor, and 
the mere fact that he can destroy it or alter 
it does not make the disposition testamentary, 
although if the trust were not to arise until his 
death the disposition would be testamentary. 
See §56. 
"b. Where settlor reserves power of control. 
Where the owner of property transfers it inter 
vivos to another person in trust, the fact that 
he reserves not only a power to revoke and 
modify the trust but also power to control the 
trustee as to the administration of the trust 
does not make the disposition testamentary and 
invalid for failure to comply with the require-
ments of the Statute of Wills. 
11
 c. Restrictions on testamentary disposition. 
The rule stated in this Section is applicable 
although the trust is one which could not be 
created by will. If the owner of property 
transfers it inter vivos to another person in 
trust, the intended trust is not invalid 
merely because the settlor reserves a beneficial 
life estate and a power to revoke or modify the 
trust, even though he was prohibited by statute 
from creating a similar trust by will. 
"Thus, if it is provided by statute that the 
wife of a testator shall be entitled to a certain 
portion of his estate of which she cannot be 
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deprived by will (see §146A), a married man can 
nevertheless transfer his property inter vivos in 
trust and his widow will not be entitled on his 
death to a share of the property so transferred, 
even though he reserves a life estate and power 
to revoke or modify the trust. Where, however, 
an outright gift would not operate to deprive 
the wife of her distributive share, a trust 
created under the same circumstances would be 
equally ineffective. 
"d. Purpose of the settlor. A trust in which 
the settlor reserves the beneficial life estate 
and a power to revoke and modify the trust is not 
invalid for failure to comply with the requirements 
of the Statute of Wills merely because the purpose 
of the settlor in creating the trust was to avoid 
the requirements of the Statute of Wills or to 
avoid the necessity of probate administration, or 
to avoid restrictions on testamentary disposi-
tions.11 
In 1 Restatement of Trusts 2d Appendix §57, the following 
is found: 
"There is a difference between the situation 
where the death of the settlor is a condition 
precedent to the creation of a trust, and the 
situation where the trust is created during 
the lifetime of the settlor, although he 
reserves power to revoke it. In the former 
case no trust is created unless the require-
ments for the execution of a will are complied 
with. See §56. In the latter case the trust 
is not testamentary and may be created without 
compliance with the requirements for the 
execution of a will." 
CONCLUSION 
The testimony of the attorney at the trial in this 
matter and Exhibit "C" representing the written directions of 
trustor establish by clear and convincing evidence that 
Respondent was meant to receive a specific cash distribution 
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and was not to share with the three natural children in the 
residuary estate of the trust. It is clear that a scrivener's 
mistake occurred when the attorney failed to exclude Respondent 
from the provisions of the paragraph distributing the residuary 
estate. 
There appears to be a unanimity among the cases that 
the most obvious basis for reformation is a scrivener's mistake 
which thwarts the purposes and intention of the party executing 
the document. Trusts, contracts and deeds have been routinely 
reformed when the evidence was clear and convincing that a 
scrivener's error had taken place. 
We respectfully urge the Court to reverse the judgment 
of the Trial Court and direct that the subject inter vivos trust 
be reformed to exclude Respondent from sharing in the residuary 
estate. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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